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AFTER YEARS of discussions, compromises, and revisions, the USDA Agricultural 
Marketing Service (AMS) published the 
ϐinal interim rule on August 1, 2008, 
regarding Country of Origin Labeling 
(COOL). Full enforcement of COOL 
began on March 16, 2009. 
There was little opposition to 
COOL for most of the commodities 
covered; however, COOL for muscle 
cuts of beef and pork has raised 
international trade concerns. Soon 
after the United States released its 
interim ϐinal rule for COOL, Canada 
and Mexico initiated a dispute with 
the United States at the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). The WTO panel 
determined that provisions of COOL for 
cattle and hogs violated the WTO trade 
agreement. The United States revised 
the rule for COOL in May 2013. As of 
November 2013, Canada and Mexico 
are exploring possible retaliatory 
measures against the United States.
The legal and economic issues 
pertaining to the WTO ruling have been 
discussed at length elsewhere. However, 
the domestic impacts of the COOL 
regulation for cattle and hogs, although 
important, have been mostly ignored. 
We discuss these impacts here.
Specifi cs of the Regulations
COOL requires providing consumers 
speciϐic labels. Until May of 2013, 
the labels essentially identiϐied the 
countries of origin ordered by where 
most value was added. For example, 
meat from cattle born and raised in 
Canada but slaughtered in the United 
States was labeled “Product of Canada 
and the United States.”
In response to WTO rulings, 
AMS amended its rule for COOL in 
May 2013. The new rule adds more 
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information, such that 
labels now identify the 
country of birth, the 
country where an animal 
is fed, and the country 
where an animal is 
slaughtered. For example, 
meat from a cattle born 
and raised in Canada 
but slaughtered in 
the United States is 
now be labeled as 
“Born and raised in Canada, 
slaughtered in the United States.” 
COOL has been justiϐied on the 
ground that consumers want to 
know where their food comes from. 
However, if consumers sufϐiciently 
valued COOL and the costs of COOL 
were small, proϐit-maximizing meat 
packers would have offered COOL to 
capture the premium consumers are 
willing to pay for COOL.
The argument for COOL contrasts 
with empirical evidence that shows 
that consumers place signiϐicantly more 
value to attributes other than country 
of origin, such as food safety. In its 
dispute with Canada and Mexico, the 
United States made it clear that food 
safety was not a motive for COOL. If the 
motivation for COOL was food safety, it 
would be an implicit admission by the 
United States that its food safety system 
is inadequate, as food imports are 
subject to the same standards as food 
produced domestically. 
Economic Impacts of COOL
COOL requires the transmission of 
country of origin information from 
farms to consumers. Labeling products 
through a supply chain is not very 
costly when there is a single origin. 
However, for feedlots and packers 
that accept animals from multiple 
origins, COOL requires segregation 
and additional management of animals 
and meat according to their country 
of origin. As such, COOL imposes 
additional costs to facilities that accept 
domestic and imported animals, thus 
lowering the demand for imported 
animals.
Feeders and processors of hogs 
and cattle are those that are the 
most directly impacted by COOL. In 
particular, it is the facilities that relied 
on imports before COOL that are the 
most negatively impacted, as they 
must either incur the direct cost of 
COOL or exclusively source animals 
domestically at a higher cost. The 
facilities that did not import animals are 
indirectly affected as they face greater 
competition for domestic animals, thus 
increasing their procurement costs.
Increased competition for domestic 
cattle and hogs translates into higher 
prices for domestic hogs and cattle, thus 
making hog and cattle producers the 
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Current trade complications
A number of trade complications 
between the United States and China 
have prevented US producers from 
fully taking advantage of agricultural 
needs in China, especially where 
pork, beef, and poultry are concerned. 
Some of these trade barriers are 
artiϐicial, such as subsidies and import 
duties, and are meant allow domestic 
livestock producers in China to remain 
competitive so as to retain food 
independence.
Technical barriers, whether artiϐicial 
or not, have also proven to be a factor 
in the unstable demand for US products 
in China, and have prevented many 
producers developing markets in China. 
China has been historically unaccepting of 
certain practices that are common in the 
United States, such as using genetically 
modiϐied strands of soybeans, wheat, and 
corn, and the use of ractopamine in pork. 
China has restricted US beef imports due 
to the outbreak of BSE in the US beef herd. 
US political ofϐicials have also shown a 
general distrust of Chinese food quality 
standards, and have placed restrictions on 
poultry imported from China, furthering 
trade complications.
Overcoming Complications and 
Leveraging Trade Opportunities
The United States, and Iowa in particular, 
as a signiϐicant producer of livestock 
and livestock feed grains, could create 
mutually beneϐicial trade opportunities 
with China. However, the Chinese 
government is concerned about the 
possible impact that large-scale purchases 
would have on prices in world markets. 
One such way of overcoming current 
trade complications would be through the 
use of long-term production contracts, 
either with livestock producers, feed 
producers, or both. In this type of 
scenario, a US farmer could enter into a 
contract with a Chinese company willing 
to pay for feed, construction costs, or 
any other barrier currently restricting a 
US farmer from producing livestock for 
China’s market. The Chinese investors 
could retain ownership of the animal, 
with both parties beneϐiting from a 
contractually obligated purchase amount 
and price, thus helping stabilize demand.
Secondly, China has more labor than 
almost any other country. If it were to 
further open its market to imported 
livestock feed, it would free millions of 
acres of arable land and laborers for 
production of labor-intensive crops, 
such as berries, fruits, vegetables, 
ϐlowers, spices, honey, and dozens of 
other products. US imports of processed 
fruits and vegetables has already risen 
to $1 billion in 2012, and lessening the 
restrictions on a free-market would 
allow the United States to become a 
major exporter of feed grains to China, 
while at the same time offsetting the 
trade by becoming an even larger 
importer of China’s value-added 
agricultural products. 
View the accompanying ϔigures to 
this article at www.card.iastate.edu/
ag_policy_review. 
direct beneϐiciaries of COOL. Stronger 
demand for US cattle and hogs from 
COOL increases farm prices most likely 
by only a few percentage points. Even 
if COOL helps improve the proϐitability 
of farms, not all farmers support COOL, 
as some see the policy as unnecessary 
government intervention.
For consumers, the impact of 
COOL is less straightforward. The 
costs from COOL to packers percolate 
all the way down to consumers who 
must then pay a higher price for meat. 
There are certainly consumers willing 
to pay a premium for COOL in red 
meat that covers the costs of COOL. 
Those consumers, however, are too 
few, as otherwise packers would have 
exploited that market niche at a large 
scale. This indicates that the increase 
in retail prices from COOL is most 
likely more than the value that the 
average consumer places on COOL for 
red meat, suggesting that mandatory 
COOL has a negative impact on the 
average consumer. 
Consumption of beef in the United 
States totals about 25 billion p ounds per 
year while consumption of pork totals 
about 23 billion pounds per year. If COOL 
increases retail prices on average by one 
cent per pound more than the value that 
consumers place in COOL, then COOL in 
red meat creates a loss to consumers of 
nearly half a billion dollars per year.
Conclusion
A manifestation of the distributional 
effects of COOL is the recent lawsuit 
against the USDA regarding the rules 
of COOL. The parties involved in the 
lawsuit illustrate well those who gain 
and those who lose from COOL. The 
American Meat Institute, the largest 
meat industry association, leads 
the lawsuit and is joined by several 
other associations representing meat 
processors, along with trade groups 
from Canada and Mexico. Note that 
National Cattlemen’s Beef Association 
joined the lawsuit, highlighting that the 
regulation does not receive the support 
of all producers. In early hearings, 
other producer groups and one activist 
group intervened in favor of the USDA. 
A preliminary injunction stopping the 
latest COOL rules was declined in the 
middle of September. The lawsuit now 
follows its course and along with the 
outcome of the litigation at the WTO, 
will deϐine the future of COOL in the 
United States. 
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